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ABSTRACT:  We explore the impact of multilateral liberalization, with 
emphasis on the EU and developing countries. We first develop a realistic 
"baseline" that takes into account events such as the entry of China into 
the WTO and the enlargement of the EU, allowing us to focus on those 
effects that are specifically attributable to further trade liberalization in 
the Doha Round. We then employ a global applied general equilibrium 
model, featuring capital accumulation and imperfect competition. Our 
Doha scenarios include agriculture, manufactures, and services 
liberalization, and trade facilitation. With agglomeration, OECD 
agricultural liberalization is not uniformly positive for LDCs. 
Keywords: WTO; Doha Round; trade liberalization; services trade, 
trade facilitation, CGE modeling 
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1.   Introduction 
After the failed attempts in Seattle in late 1999, the Ministerial Meeting of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in Doha, in November 2001 launched the 
agenda for a new comprehensive round of multilateral trade negotiations. At the 
behest of the EU, the ministerial declaration emphasized that the Doha Round 
should provide a major opportunity for developing countries.  Consequently the 
agenda for new WTO round has been coined the ‘Doha Development Agenda’.  
In this paper we explore the likely economic effects of the new WTO Doha 
round for Europe, and for major developing regions.  Our methodology is 
comparable to that used in recent studies of these issues by the World Bank, the 
IMF, and the OECD.  However, we extend this literature by including market 
structure and investment effects in the modeling exercise, and by stressing a 
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policy benchmark including China’s accession to the WTO, the Agenda 2000 
reforms to the CAP, enlargement of the EU, and recent EU FTAs.  We cover the 
areas of agricultural liberalization, liberalization in industrial tariffs, liberalization 
in services trade, and trade facilitation measures. Our services scenarios build on 
gravity-equation based estimates of services barriers. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the liberalization scenarios 
for the subsequent quantitative analysis. Chapter four describes briefly the 
modeling framework used. Chapter five discusses the results of our liberalization 
scenarios. It starts with a section on global results, proceeding with the results for 
the EU and finally discussing the estimated impact on the Netherlands. 
 
2.  The Policy Landscape and Trade Liberalization Scenarios 
The core of our analysis is structured around a set of scenarios.  These scenarios are 
based on alternative liberalization approaches for agriculture, manufactured goods, 
and services trade. They are meant to illustrate the implications of alternative 
approaches to market access liberalization. They are stylized rather than exact 
representations.  In part, this is because we are working with an aggregate model (i.e. 
we do not model trade at the 6-digit HS level), and as such detailed treatment of all 
product-specific proposals is simply impossible. In addition, the actual market 
access modalities remain to be worked out.  In agriculture, domestic support may or 
may not be affected, developing countries may or may not have to liberalize, and 
certain politically sensitive sectors may yet again escape from meaningful 
liberalization. Our scenarios are themselves decomposed into different components, 
related to specific sets of countries and specific sectors and instruments.  This offers 
the advantage of allowing us (or the reader) to construct rough representations of 
hybrid liberalization experiments later, since individual components can be taken 
from different scenarios and combined.2 
 
2.1 The Policy Landscape  
Tariff negotiations in the GATT/WTO have generally been based on tariff 
bindings, or schedules of concessions tabled under GATT rules, and the 
coverage and level of these bindings is an important element of the initial 
conditions for the negotiations. provides information on the share of industrial-
product tariffs (on a trade-weighted basis) that remains either unbound or bound 
above applied rates. While tariffs in the OECD (and Latin America) are generally 
                                                 
2 Technically, decomposition of general equilibrium-related effects of policy scenarios 
exhibits path dependence, meaning that the decomposition can be sensitive to the 
ordering of the elements of the experiment set.  The impact of a particular instrument is 
also sensitive to the other members of the set.  We employ a linear decomposition 
method in this paper that does not exhibit path dependence (Harrison et al 2000).  As 
such, individual experiment elements are roughly additive.  
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bound, many Asian and African economy tariffs remain unbound despite more 
than a four-fold increase in the coverage of developing-country tariff bindings in 
the Uruguay Round (Abreu 1996). For almost all developing countries, existing 
bindings are, on average, well above applied rates, reflecting a combination of 
relatively high initial bindings, and the subsequent wave of reductions in applied 
rates.  (See Blackhurst et al 1996, Francois 2001). 
In addition to general Uruguay Round commitments, there have also been efforts 
for sector-based commitments to implement zero tariffs (called “zero-for-zero”).  
This is reflected in the next-to-last column of Table 2-1. As a result of zero-for-
zero efforts, OECD economies have between roughly 10% and 30% of tariff 
lines bound at zero percent.  Most developing countries have opted out of this 
process.  Zero-for-zero increased developed country duty-free imports to 43% of 
total imports (Laird 1998). The process itself ground to a halt after the initial 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA).  This seems to have been for two 
reasons: (i) the sectors in which OECD economies could easily reach agreement 
had already been included, and (ii) those sectors remaining involve North-South 
issues not susceptible to this approach.  In other words, the cherries have been 
picked, leaving us with the hard nuts.  
With the implementation of Uruguay Round commitments, average ad valorem 
tariffs in the industrial countries generally are around 3 percent.  This is reflected 
in the first columns of Table 2-2.  However, there are important exceptions.  One 
of these is textiles and clothing, where the average rate is roughly three times this 
average.  This is reflected in the standard deviation and maximum tariff columns.  
With full implementation of current commitments, the estimatd simple average 
industrial tariff in the United States is 3.2 percent, with a standard deviation of 
4.3, and a maximum tariff of 37.5 percent.  The European Union has a higher 
average, but less dispersion. (The EU has an average of 3.7 percent, a standard 
deviation of 3.6 percent, and a maximum tariff of 17 percent.)  For the 
developing countries in Table 2-1, average industrial tariffs range from a low of 3 
to 4 percent to a high of more than 20 percent.  Table 2-2 presents detailed data 
for three developing countries:  Brazil, India, and Thailand.  These countries span 
the spectrum of developing country bindings as reflected in Table 2-1.  Brazil’s 
tariffs are all bound, though the average rate for industrial products is 14.9 
percentage points above the current applied rate.  This gap is called a “binding 
overhang.”  (See Francois and Martin 2003). India and Thailand’s tariffs are 
partially covered by bindings, again with significant binding overhang. In general, 
for developing countries, binding overhang is large enough that reductions in the 
range of 50% are necessary to force reductions in average applied rates for 
countries like Brazil.  For many countries, even this will have little or no effect, as 
tariffs are largely unbound.  Of course, this limits severely the negotiating 
leverage of developing countries in the WTO. This is also why the debate of 
using bound, applied, or “historic” rates as a starting point is important. 
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As in the case of industrial tariffs, the stage for any future agriculture negotiations 
was also set by the Uruguay Round outcome -- this time by the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA).  One key difference from industrial products 
is that essentially all agricultural tariffs are bound. However, in both industrial 
and developing countries, there is a large degree of binding overhang resulting 
from “dirty tariffication” or the use of “ceiling bindings” (Hathaway and Ingco 
1996). The next round of agricultural negotiations was scheduled in the URAA, 
while the negotiating parameters (tariffs, tariff-rate-quota levels, subsidy 
commitments, etc.) must also be viewed in the context of the schedules of 
URAA commitments.  The system that has emerged is complex and similar to 
arrangements in the textile and clothing sectors, featuring a mix of bilaterally 
allocated tariff-rate-quotas (with associated quota rents) and tariffs. Viewed in 
conjunction with industrial protection, the basic pattern is that the industrial 
countries protect agriculture and processed food, while protection in developing 
countries is more balanced (though also higher overall) in its focus on food and 
non-food manufactured goods.   
The URAA had a stated goal of no backsliding and modest liberalization.  
However, negotiating parties (generally the relevant agriculture ministries) gave 
considerable leeway to themselves with regard to selection of the appropriate 
reference period from which to measure export subsidy reductions.  In addition, the 
move to a price-based system for protection has, in many cases, been subsumed 
into an effective adoption of explicit quotas.  The disciplines on domestic subsidies 
have also been weakened by a relatively soft definition of the AMS vis-à-vis 
individual subsidies and the scope for reallocation of expenditures within the AMS.  
(See Tangermann 1998 for discussion.)  Commitments not to erode current market 
access were meant to limit the scope for increased protection through dirty 
tariffication.  As the name implies, dirty tariffication involved violations of the spirit, 
if not the letter, of the URAA text.  It involved setting tariff bindings at rates far 
above then current effective protection rates.  The practice of setting high bindings 
complicated the problem of measuring the impact of further commitments to 
reduce bindings.  Basically, in agriculture, we are in a world that allows scope for 
great policy discretion and uncertainty as a result of the loose nature of the 
commitments made.  In addition, the setting of high bound rates made possible the 
conversion of NTBs into even more restrictive import tariffs.  This in turn made 
quantity disciplines necessary to avoid backsliding. Despite the goals of subsidy 
reductions and a shift toward price-based border measures, one of the more striking 
features of the regime that has actually emerged is the prominent role that quantity 
measures have taken in the new architecture.  Basically, the agricultural trading 
system is complicated and still evolving. Policy measurement in this area has 
converged on the use of price-based measurements that emphasize the tax/subsidy 
equivalent of policy.  (As this approach reflects available data, this is the approach 
we employ in this paper as well.)   
For services, “market access” is a problematic concept.   From the outset, service 
negotiations have been "qualitative."  They have not targeted numeric measures, 
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but rather commitments in the cross-border movement of consumers and 
providers and the establishment of foreign providers.  In fact, for academics, the 
GATS seems to confuse FDI and migration with international trade.  As a result, 
efforts to quantify market access in service sectors (a basic requirement if we 
want to then quantify liberalization) have been problematic at best.  The standard 
approach (an example is Hoekman 1995) has been to produce inventory 
measures.  As an alternative perspective, we follow Francois (2001) and have 
produced estimates of "tariff equivalents" for services trade.  These are based on 
a simple gravity model, estimated from detailed global trade data for services 
trade in 1997.  The basic approach is described in the annex to this paper 
(available upon request).  The resulting estimates are summarized in Table 2-3.  
The estimates are admittedly crude.  The pattern that emerges is consistent with 
that for industrial tariffs.  It appears that barriers to services trade are higher 
(often much higher) in developing countries than in the OECD.  Hence, as in the 
case of industrial tariffs, the effects of further GATS negotiations will hinge 
critically on developing country participation or non-participation, and the extent 
to which they commit to actual liberalization rather than stand-stills (the 
qualitative equivalent of ceiling bindings). 
   
2.2 Trading costs 
With the reduction in traditional trade barriers, attention in the regional and 
multilateral trade arenas has not only shifted to quantity restrictions, but also to 
trade facilitation measures.  These are meant to target less transparent trade 
barriers, such as customs procedures, product standards and conformance 
certifications, licensing requirements, and related administrative sources of 
trading costs.  Studies of regional integration initiatives (Baldwin and Francois 
1997, Smith and Venables 1988) have emphasized the potential for liberalization 
initiatives to substantially reduce such barriers.  Conceptually, these costs are 
different from the price and quantity measures used for manufactures and 
agriculture.  They are a pure global deadweight loss. 
The estimates of trading costs are very rough (at best).  Nonetheless, they 
provide some sense of the magnitudes involved.  An overview of estimates is 
provided in Table 2-4.  In the context of the EC single market program, 
elimination of internal customs procedures and related administrative 
streamlining were projected to reduced trading costs by up to 2 percent of the 
value of trade (EC 1988).  Globally, UNCTAD (1994) has noted that trading 
costs represent 7 to 10 percent of the cost of delivered goods.  Like the EC, 
UNCTAD also estimates that simple trade facilitation measures could reduce 
these costs by 2 percent of the value of trade.  The Australian Industry 
Commission (1995) has estimated potentially higher savings in the context of 
APEC, ranging from 5 to 10 percent of the value of trade.  Under more modest 
facilitation initiatives, the Japanese Economic Planning Agency (1997) has 
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estimated savings at 2 percent in an APEC context, while Francois (2001) has 
employed a similar range of estimates. 
 
2.3 Policy scenarios 
To bring these elements together, we define three sets of scenarios (See Table 2-
5).  The first two are partial liberalization scenarios. In the “Linear 50%” all trade 
instruments are reduced by 50%. This involves a 50% reduction in agricultural 
and industrial tariffs and export subsidies, a 50% reduction in OECD domestic 
support for agriculture, a 50% reduction in the tariff-equivalent of services 
barriers, and a partial reduction in trading costs, related to trade facilitation 
measures.  Services liberalization involves a 50% or a full reduction in the barriers 
shown in Table 2-3. The second partial liberalization experiment is called the 
“Swiss formula” experiment. In this experiment the reduction in import tariffs in 
agriculture and manufacture is  based on a straight Swiss formula with a 
coefficient of 0.25, meaning the maximum tariff is reduced to 25%.  (See 
Francois and Martin 2003). The third scenario simply involves full elimination of 
all trade barriers. Trade facilitation, based on the range of available estimates, is 
assumed to range between 1.5 percent of the value of trade (partial liberalization) 
and 3 percent (full liberalization).   
Each experiment is decomposed, both in terms of sectors and instruments, and 
also in terms of country grouping.  An example is given in Table 2-6 were the 
world welfare effect (equivalent variation) is decomposed across sectoral 
instruments and regions.  Because of the decomposition method used, this means 
that the reader can roughly pick and choose, combining the results of hybrid 
experiments involving elements from different experiments, for a rough sense of 
possible effects. For example, if in the next WTO round, the outcome will be 
only 50% liberalization in manufactures in all regions and trade facilitation only in 
OECD countries, the estimated world welfare effect is approximately $80 billion 
($34 billion due to liberalization in manufacturing and $46 billion due to trade 
facilitation in the OECD). 
Finally, for each of the experiments employ alternative model features (these 
model features are discussed in more detail in section 3.2). First, we include 
short-run versus long-run effects. In the short-run capital stocks are fixed and in 
the long-run capital stocks adjust (See Francois et al 1996). Second, we 
alternatively employ perfect competition and imperfect competition in the 
manufacturing and services sectors. With perfect competition we assume 
constant returns to scale and with imperfect competition we assume 
monopolistic competition with increasing returns to scale, firm-level product 
differentiation, and average cost pricing.  The model therefore includes the basic 
features of “economic geography” models, including intermediate linkages, 
monopolistic competition, and returns from specialization. (See Francois and 
Nelson 2002). For the agricultural sectors (except for the food processing 
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industry) we maintain constant returns to scale in all cases.  In this study we use 
the constant returns to scale scenario mainly as a benchmark scenario to assess 
the impact of the increasing returns to scale features and it facilitates comparison 
with other studies that mainly use constant returns to scale in all sectors. 
 
3. The Model and Data 
This section provides a brief overview of the global computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model used in this study.  The model is characterized by an 
input-output structure (based on regional and national input-output tables) that 
explicitly links industries in a value added chain from primary goods, over 
continuously higher stages of intermediate processing, to the final assembling of 
goods and services for consumption.  Inter-sectoral linkages are direct, like the 
input of steel in the production of transport equipment, and indirect, via 
intermediate use in other sectors.  The model captures these linkages by 
modeling firms' use of factors and intermediate inputs.  The most important 
aspects of the model can be summarized as follows:  (i) it covers all world trade 
and production; (ii) it allows for scale economies and imperfect competition; (iii) 
it includes intermediate linkages between sectors; (iv) and it allows for trade to 
affect capital stocks through investment effects.  The last point means we model 
medium to long-run investment effects.  The inclusion of scale economies and 
imperfect competition implies agglomeration effects like those emphasized in the 
recent economic geography literature.  
 
3.1 Model Data and the Benchmark 
Our data come from a number of sources.  Data on production and trade are 
based on national social accounting data linked through trade flows (see Reinert 
and Roland-Holst 1997).  These social accounting data are drawn directly from 
the most recent version of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) dataset, 
version 5.2. (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002).  The GTAP version 5 dataset is 
benchmarked to 1997, and includes detailed national input-output, trade, and 
final demand structures.  The basic social accounting and trade data are 
supplemented with trade policy data, including additional data on tariffs and non-
tariff barriers.  
The data on tariffs are taken from the WTO's integrated database, with 
supplemental information from the World Bank's recent assessment of detailed 
pre- and post-Uruguay Round tariff schedules and from the UNCTAD/World 
Bank WITS dataset.  All of this tariff information has been concorded to GTAP 
model sectors. Services trade barriers are based on the estimates described in 
chapter three and the technical annex.  We also work with the schedule of China 
accession commitments (Francois and Spinanger 2001). 
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Table 2-1 
Industrial tariff rates and bindings -- post UR and ITA 
 Percent of MFN imports that are subject to: Tariff lines 
 bound tariffs unbound tariffs tariffs bound 
above applied 
rates 
tariffs unbound 
or bound above 
applied rates 
Share of bound 
duty free tariff 
lines to total tar. 
lines 
Total tariff lines
Argentina 100.0 0.0 99.9 99.9 0.0 10530 
Australia 96.9 3.1 31.7 34.8 17.7 5520 
Brazil 100.0 0.0 91.0 91.0 0.5 10860 
Canada 99.8 0.2 45.7 45.9 34.5 6261 
Chile 100.0 0.0 99.7 99.7 0.0 5055 
Colombia 100.0 0.0 97.7 97.7 0.0 6145 
El Salvador 97.1 2.9 96.0 98.9 0.0 4922 
European Union 100.0 0.0 17.7 17.7 26.9 7635 
Hungary 93.6 6.4 3.3 9.7 10.4 5896 
India 69.3 30.7 14.8 45.5 0.0 4354 
Indonesia 92.3 7.7 86.6 94.3 0.0 7735 
Japan 95.9 4.1 0.1 4.2 47.4 7339 
Korea 89.8 10.2 3.4 13.6 11.6 8882 
Malaysia 79.3 20.7 31.0 51.7 1.6 10832 
México 100.0 0.0 98.4 98.4 0.0 11255 
New Zealand 100.0 0.0 46.5 46.5 39.5 5894 
Norway 100.0 0.0 36.5 36.5 46.6 5326 
Peru 100.0 0.0 98.5 98.5 0.0 4545 
Phillipines 67.4 32.6 15.5 48.1 0.0 5387 
Poland 92.8 7.2 44.6 51.8 2.2 4354 
Singapore 36.5 63.5 11.7 75.2 15.2 4963 
Sri Lanka 9.2 90.8 1.4 92.2 0.1 5933 
Thailand 67.4 32.6 8.9 41.5 0.0 5244 
Tunisia 67.9 32.1 41.5 73.6 0.0 5087 
Turkey 49.3 50.7 0.0 50.7 1.4 15479 
United States 100.0 0.0 14.0 14.0 39.4 7872 
Uruguay 100.0 0.0 96.3 96.3 0.0 10530 
Venezuela 100.0 0.0 90.3 90.3 0.0 5974 
Zimbabwe 13.6 86.4 3.9 90.3 3.0 1929 
       
source: Francois (2001), based on WTO and World Bank data on Uruguay Round and post-Information Technology Agreement 
schedules. 
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Table 2-3 
Estimated Services Trade Barriers (percent trade cost equivalents) 
Label Region Trade  
Trans-
port and 
logistics 
business 
services 
other 
services 
NLD Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
FRA France 12.3 12.1 18.3 19.2 
DEU Germany 0.0 13.7 9.5 0.0 
REU15 Rest of EU 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CEEC CEECs 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
MED 
Mediterannean and 
Middle East 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NAM North America 0.0 22.6 1.2 16.0 
SAM South America 13.8 10.4 8.6 5.9 
CHINA China 0.0 14.5 37.4 3.7 
INDIA India 61.3 63.9 32.1 62.2 
HINCAS High income asia 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 
OASPAC Other Asia-Pacific 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AUSNZ 
Australia and New 
Zealand 0.0 2.3 9.5 15.2 
SAF South Africs 28.3 17.5 32.8 22.6 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ROW Rest of World 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Based on gravity equation estimates.    
 
Table 2-4 
ESTIMATED COST SAVINGS FROM TRADE FACILITATION 
European Commission (1992) In the context of the Single Market 
program, savings may amount to 1.6 
percent to 1.7 percent of the value of trade 
due to savings on administrative costs of 
transactions represent 7 to 10% of the 
value of trade. 
UNCTAD (1994)  Trade facilitation could reduce this to 5% 
to 8%. 
Australian Industry Commission (1995) Trade facilitation may save 5% to 10% of 
the total value of trade, through reduced 
transaction costs, in the APEC context. 
Japan EPA (1997)  A “modest” APEC initiative may lead to 
2% savings (as a share of the value of 
trade) due to reduced transaction costs. 
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Table 2-5 
Scenario definitions      
   Instruments Linear 50% Swiss formula
Full 
liberalisation 
Import tariffs in 
agriculture and 
manufacturing  50% reduction 
Swiss formula 
reduction (with 
a max 25% 
tariff) 
100% 
reduction 
Estimated border 
measures in services 50% reduction 50% reduction 
100% 
reduction 
Export subsidies 50% reduction 50% reduction 
100% 
reduction 
Domestic agricultural 
support in OECD 
countries 50% reduction 50% reduction 
100% 
reduction  
Trade facilitation 
1.5% of value 
of trade 
1.5% of value 
of trade 
3% of value of 
trade 
 
 
Table 2-6: Total welfare gains of linear 50% experiment decomposed by 
sectoral instruments and regions 
  OECD LDCs Inter-
action 
effects 
Total 
Agricultural liberalization    
(border measures) 
24482 32446  56928
Agricultural liberalization    
(domestic support) 
8744    8744
Manufactures                       
(border measures) 
12057 22230  34287
Services liberalization 
 
17225 6907  24132
Trade facilitation 
 
46159 26152  72311
Interaction effects 
 
     15974
Total 
 
108667 87735 15974 212376
Source model simulations 
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While the basic GTAP dataset is benchmarked to 1997, and reflects applied 
tariffs actually in place in 1997, we of course want to work with a representation 
of a post-Uruguay Round world.  We also want to include the accession of China, 
the enlargement of the EU, and Adenda 2000 reforms as part of the baseline.  To 
accomplish this, before conducting any policy experiments we first run a "pre-
experiment" in which we do the following: 
 implement the rest of the Uruguay Round tariff commitments, 
 implement the ATC (textile and clothing quotas) phaseout, 
 implement China’s accession to the WTO, 
 implement Agenda 2000, 
 and Implement the EU enlargement. 
 
As such, the dataset we work with for actual experiments is a representation of a 
notional world economy (with values in 1997 dollars) wherein we have realized 
many of the trade policy reforms already programmed for the next few years. 
The social accounting data have been aggregated to 17 sectors and 16 regions. 
The sectors and regions for the 17x16 aggregation of the data are given in Table 
3.1 (a more detailed mapping between the aggregated sectors and regions and the 
original GTAP regions and sectors is given in a technical annex available on 
request). 
 
3.2 Theoretical structure 
We turn next to the basic theoretical features of the model.  More discussion is 
provided in a separate technical annex, available upon request. In all regions there 
is a single representative, composite household in each region, with expenditures 
allocated over personal consumption and savings (future consumption). The 
composite household owns endowments of the factors of production and 
receives income by selling them to firms. It also receives income from tariff 
revenue and rents accruing from import/export quota licenses (when applicable). 
Part of the income is distributed as subsidy payments to some sectors, primarily 
in agriculture.  
 
On the production side, in all sectors, firms employ domestic production factors 
(capital, labor and land) and intermediate inputs from domestic and foreign 
sources to produce outputs in the most cost-efficient way that technology allow.  
Perfect competition is assumed in the agricultural sectors as indicated in Table 
3.1 (notice that the processed food products sector is characterized by increasing 
returns to scale). In these sectors, products from different regions are assumed to 
be imperfect substitutes in accordance with the so-called "Armington" 
assumption. Production under imperfect competition is discussed below.   
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Table 3.1  
Sectors and regions 
NLD Netherlands CERE* Cerals 
FRA France HORT* Horticulture & other crops 
DEU Germany SUGA* Sugar, plants and processed 
REU15 Rest of EU 
INTLIV
* Intensive livestock &products 
CEEC CEECs CATLE* Cattle & beef products 
MED Mediterannean and Middle East DAIRY* Milk & dairy 
NAM North America OAGR* Other agriculture 
SAM South America PROCF Processed food products 
CHINA China TEXT Textiles, leather & clothing 
INDIA India EXTR Extraction industries 
HINCAS High income asia CHEM Petro & chemicals 
OASPA
C Other Asia-Pacific MELE Metal and electotechnical ind 
AUSNZ Australia and New Zealand OIND Other industries 
SAF South Africs TRAD Trade services 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa TRAN Transport services 
ROW Rest of World BSVC 
Business, financial & 
communnications services 
    OSVC 
 Other private and public 
services 
        
* denotes a competitive sector in all applications. 
 
Prices on goods and factors adjust until all markets are simultaneously in 
(general) equilibrium.  This means that we solve for equilibria in which all 
markets clear.  While we model changes in gross trade flows, we do not model 
changes in net international capital flows. Rather our capital market closure 
involves fixed net capital inflows and outflows.  (This does not preclude changes 
in gross capital flows).  To summarize, factor markets are competitive, and labor 
and capital are mobile between sectors but not between regions. 
We model manufacturing and services as involving imperfect competition.  The 
approach followed involves monopolistic competition. Monopolistic competition 
involves scale economies that are internal to each firm, depending on its own 
production level. In particular, based on estimates of price-cost markups, we 
model the sector as being characterized by Chamberlinian large-group 
monopolistic competition. (For more on this approach, see Francois and Roland-
Holst 1997.)  An important property of the monopolistic competition model is 
that increased specialization at intermediate stages of production yields returns 
due to specialization, where the sector as a whole becomes more productive the 
broader the range of specialized inputs.  These gains spill over through two-way 
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trade in specialized intermediate goods.  With these spillovers, trade liberalization 
can lead to global scale effects related to specialization.  With international scale 
economies, regional welfare effects depend on a mix of efficiency effects, global 
scale effects, and terms-of-trade effects.  (Again see Francois and Roland-Holst 
1997). Similar gains follow from consumer good specialization.  
Another important feature involves a dynamic link, whereby the static or direct 
income effects of trade liberalization induce shifts in the regional pattern of 
savings and investment.  These effects have been explored extensively in the 
trade literature, and relate to classical models of capital accumulation and growth, 
rather than to endogenous growth mechanisms.  Research in this area includes 
Baldwin and Francois (1999), Smith (1976, 1977), and Srinivasan and Bhagwati 
(1980).  Several studies of the Uruguay Round (see for example Francois, 
McDonald and Nordstrom 1993, 1994) also incorporated variations on this 
mechanism, along with variations in market structure. Such effects compound 
initial output welfare effects over the medium-run, and can magnify income gains 
or losses. How much these "accumulation effects" will supplement static effects 
depends on a number of factors, including the marginal product of capital and 
underlying savings behavior.   It also hinges along interactions with market 
structure. In the present application, we work with a classical savings-investment 
mechanism (discussed briefly in the appendix, and also in Francois, McDonald 
and Nordstrom 1997).  This means we model long-run linkages between changes 
in income, savings, and investment.  The results reported here therefore include 
changes in the capital stock, and the medium- to long-run implications of such 
changes.   
 
4 Results 
 
4.1 Global effects  
We now turn to the results of the experiments outlines in chapter two. Tables 4-1 
to 4-4 present a summary of results at the global level.  The tables present a 
breakdown of the national income effects (technically measured as equivalent 
variation) resulting from the various policy experiments along the lines of major 
sector components.  Table 4-1 is focused on agriculture, Table 4-2 is focused on 
manufactures, Tables 4-3 is focused on services liberalization, and Table 4-4 
focuses on trade facilitation. The Tables also give a breakdown of the effects of 
scale economies, through a comparison of a perfect competition version of the 
model to the one with scale economies and imperfect competition.  We consider 
the increasing returns case to be the most relevant, and unless indicated 
otherwise, the discussion of results pertains to this version of the model.   
From the initial set of income effect tables, we can see that agricultural 
liberalization offers a mixed set of results.  Liberalization of domestic support in 
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the OECD, on the other hand, is generally positive for the OECD, though with 
negative consequences for sub-Saharan Africa.  We find that significant, though 
limited, liberalization yields positive results globally, and regionally for Europe, 
Africa, and most of Asia.  However, on net agricultural liberalization is a mixed-
bag, with gains in most areas from elimination of domestic support, but with 
more mixed results from the elimination of border measures.  Static results are 
consistently positive if constant returns to scale (CRS) are assumed, but induced 
changes in investment, combined with the imperfect competition features of the 
model, point to negative effects over the longer-run. 
Specifically, we find unexpected welfare effects from agricultural liberalisation in 
the following cases:    
• Australia and New Zealand, who are both net agricultural exporters, and 
are generally favouring agricultural liberalization. Those countries are 
usually expected to gain from improved market access in other countries.  
• Mediterranean countries who are close to the EU and are usually 
expected to gain from liberalization in the heavily protected EU 
agricultural markets. 
• Other non-OECD countries (India, China, South Africa, SSA) who do 
not liberalize themselves and loose when their access to OECD markets 
is improved. 
• Gains for South America are very limited. As a big agricultural exporter, 
they are generally expected to gain more from liberalization.  
In order to understand these unexpected results it is important to distinguish the 
standard perfect competition and CRS case, which most other Doha studies use 
from our modeling of industrial sectors as exhibiting imperfect competition and 
IRS.   For almost all regions the explanation of the negative welfare results under 
imperfect competition is straightforward: Due to trade liberalization in 
agriculture their agricultural sectors expand, because they gain by getting better 
access to OECD markets. However, the agricultural sectors are all perfectly 
competitive sectors with constant returns to scale. The expanding agricultural 
sectors draw resources from industrial sectors. As a consequence, the industrial 
sectors have to contract, which has negative implications for welfare because they 
cannot achieve cost effective scales of production. Therefore, the unexpected 
negative welfare effects are due in part to the presence of scale economies in 
some parts of the economy. This is a general point: If liberalization leads to 
specialization and expansion of CRS sectors, this is often inferior compared to a 
policy-induced expansion in IRS sectors. In the latter case, the traditional gains 
from liberalization are magnified by additional opportunities to utilize economies 
of scale.  
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Our results highlight the importance of taking a long-term structural view. 
CAIRNS group countries should perhaps be cautious about expecting long-term 
economy-wide gains if, as a result of liberalization, the agricultural sector draws 
more resources away from other productive uses. Developing countries also need 
to think carefully about the risks of reinforcing an emphasis on primary exports. 
The pattern for manufacturing liberalization is more consistent and positive, both 
in the initial static results, and over the long-term.  From Table 4-2, the most 
important area for manufacturing tariff liberalization is the developing countries.  
Recall from the discussion in chapter three that OECD tariffs are, on average, 
below 3 percent for manufacturing.  As a result, the impact of a Swiss-formula 
(which targets high tariffs) yields only limited effects on the OECD, while 
directly proportional cuts have a more dramatic effect.  At the extreme, we 
identify between an initial (static) effect of between $35 and $55 billion.  The one 
region consistently, and significantly, hurt by significant manufacturing 
liberalization is China.  This follows from an erosion of its terms of trade, driven 
by its growth in textile exports, combined with increased competition from other 
low wage countries (see the export effects in the annex tables).  Natural 
competitors, such as India, currently limit their participation on world markets 
through a mix of import and export barriers.  Rationalization in this area by 
developing countries leads to heightened competition against China in a number 
of sectors, with the result being income losses for China driven almost entirely by 
manufacturing and agricultural liberalization in the developing world.    
Another important source of gains is services, which yields static income gains on 
a par with remaining manufacturing tariffs, ranging, potentially, to over $50 
billion globally.  One obvious winner from services liberalization is the United 
States, which is projected to pick up a substantial share of total gains.  Another 
big winner in services, however, is somewhat less obvious.  India, which has 
moved in recent years to become a major exporter in services (including software 
and back office services) is projected to be a bigger potential winner from 
services liberalization than North America.   In fact, as a share of GDP, services 
is a more important source of gains for India than agriculture and manufacturing 
liberalization combined.  The other important source of gains for India (and for 
much of the world) is trade facilitation.  In the Asia-Pacific region, where exports 
alone are often 50 percent of GDP, trade facilitation yields a dramatic short-run 
effects as well as a long-run impact driven by investment effects (Table 4-4).   For 
the Asia-Pacific developing countries, the single most important issue is trade 
facilitation, particularly by other developing countries. 
Further detail on labor market and trade effects is provided in the annex tables.  
In general, both unskilled and skilled workers gain from the partial and full 
liberalization scenarios in most regions, except for some cases in the CEEC 
economies and China.  In China, the results are linked to the trade and income 
effects following from competition with other low-wag exporters, as discussed 
above.   The general pattern of wage effects is summarized in Figure 4.1, which 
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shows percent changes in wages for unskilled workers in all regions, under all 
three scenarios.  While this figure is somewhat difficult to read in detail, the basic 
pattern is clear – positive wage effects everywhere, under all scenarios, except for 
China in all cases and the CEECs in some cases. 
The general pattern of export effects, reported in detail in the annex tables 
(available upon request), is summarized in Figure 4.2.  Like the Figure 4.1, the 
emphasis here is not on individual values, but the general pattern of results.  
Export growth, under all scenarios, is greatest in the developing countries, 
especially in Asia and the Pacific (including India and China), but also in the 
Mediterranean, African, and Latin American economies.  The CEECs suffer 
from trade-erosion with respect to market access to the EU15 economies. 
 
4.2 Results for the (enlarged)  European Union 
The European Union is a customs union, with a common external tariff against 
supplies from third countries, and practically zero tariffs within the union. Lower 
external trade barriers affect producers and consumers in member states in two 
related ways. First there is the direct boost to competition on home markets 
through improved market access for suppliers from outside the European Union. 
Second, the relative position of suppliers within the EU might change. The 
formation of the EU customs union leads, by definition, to trade preferences 
amongst the members of the free trade area. As a consequence the share of trade 
that is within the EU (intra-EU trade) is typically biased upward, and trade within 
the EU is larger than might be expected on the basis of geographic proximity and 
other trade promoting factors alone. With the recent eastward enlargement the 
preferences are extended from the current 15 EU members to the new member 
states.3 Recall that the enlargement process has been incorporated in our baseline 
scenario. 
The lowering of external trade barriers by the EU will inevitably lead to the 
erosion of the intra-EU trade preferences. Suppliers with lower cost will be able 
to enter the EU markets once the tariff barriers have come down that currently 
shield domestic producers from foreign competition.  Consequently, we can 
expect the current bias towards intra-EU trade to be reduced. Table 4-5 nicely 
illustrates this effect by breaking down the simulated change in EU27 import 
values for one of the more modest liberalisation scenarios.
                                                 
3 Our simulations include all 12  accession candidates newcomers, i.e. we also include 
Bulgaria and Romania, although these two countries will  not enter the EU with the first 
wave of new member countries.  
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Figure 4-1 
 
Unskilled wages, percent change 
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Figure 4-2 
Exports, percent change
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Table 4-5: Percent change in value of bilateral exports (f.o.b.), linear 50% cuts (*) 
Ð from Î to EU27 LDCs Other Total 
exports 
EU27 -6 21 13 2
(4)
LDCs 30 39 25 30
(38)
Other 12 26 8 14
(15)
Total imports 3 
(5) 
28
(35)
14
(15)
12
(15)
Source: Model simulations.   
Note: (*) Short run results with scale economies. Long run results in brackets. 
 
The 2% growth in EU27 exports is small compared to the 12% growth in world 
trade.  A first driver of this result is that EU countries mostly trade amongst 
themselves. The benefits from removing the intra-EU barriers have already been 
realised in the past and there are no additional gains for intra-EU trade in a new 
WTO round. A second driver of this result is the increased competition from 
non-EU countries on EU markets. Simulated intra-EU27 trade shrinks by -6% as 
other suppliers enter the EU markets. 
The most impressive growth in markets share is realized by suppliers from LDCs, 
who are simulated to expand their exports to the EU by 30%, compared to the 
12% increase of imports from other developed countries.  
Because there is no positive growth to be expected from intra-EU trade, 
European exports can only by increased by expansion in non-EU markets. 
Exports to LDCs grow with 21% and exports to the other regions grow with 
13%. Although these growth figures are high, this is insufficient to significantly 
boost total exports as their weight in total EU27 exports is limited. 
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LDCs obtain the highest growth in exports (30%).  They are simulated to expand 
exports to all destinations, but the largest trade surge is observed for intra-LDC 
trade. Global trade creation in this experiment amounts to 12% in short run and 
15% in long run. While the trade increase materialises already in the short run for 
the EU and other developed economies, LDCs see even larger growth in their 
exports in the longer term. Dynamic capital accumulation enables them to 
specialise more in exportable goods.  
On balance, imports into the EU increase slightly faster than exports. What does 
this imply for individual industries in the European Union? A rise of imports in 
some highly protected sectors is to be expected. The pre-simulation landscape of 
import tariffs shows that the average import barriers for agricultural products 
(cereals, sugar, cattle, dairy and processed food) and textiles are the highest. 
Figure 4-3 shows that simulated imports rise as expected for these industries. The 
import growth for sugar and dairy is lower than might be expected on the basis 
of the initial import protection. This is caused by the output quota system, which 
limits the production decline as long as there are positive quota rents. The 
immediate impact of increased import competition is lower quota rents, and 
therefore lower internal EU prices. Production would only fall dramatically if 
quota rents were fully eroded, and this is not the case in our simulations. The 
lower internal prices make EU a less attractive export destination, and hence 
imports raise less than expected. 
The pre-simulation landscape of import tariffs also shows that average barriers 
encountered on EU exports are sometimes higher than the barriers erected by 
the EU (Figure 4-5). Hence, we can expect a growth of extra-EU exports to 
some destinations. Export growth may even occur for agricultural exports that 
are currently subject to export subsidies, which we reduce in the liberalisation 
scenario.  
Remarkable is the surge of trade in processed food. While it is consistent with 
recent empirical observations on the shifting composition of agri-food trade 
towards more trade in processed products (Hertel et al, 1999, Berkum and van 
Meijl, 2001), the explanation of this simulation result can be found in the data 
modelling assumptions.  
Figure 4-5 shows that the average tariff on processed food in the EU27 equals a 
significant 23% of the value of the product. But also processed food products 
exported from the EU have to climb an even higher barrier: 33%. Consequently, 
a simulated tariff reduction of 50% leads to a notable reduction of import prices, 
both in the EU as elsewhere. Another factor contributing to the expansion of 
trade is the assumption of scale economies in the processed food industry. Scale 
economies tend to promote more regional specialisation, and therefore they lead 
to more trade. As production is more concentrated in certain regions, rather than 
being spread out over diverse locations each serving a relatively narrow home 
market, more trade between regions will occur. An export-oriented region, with 
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an existing specialisation in this sector can be expected to see food processing 
activities expanding. Within the EU this leads to the Netherlands, and to a lesser 
extent France, to expand in processed foods, while other EU regions see a slight 
contraction of the industry (Table 4-6).  Other regions seeing an expanding food 
processing industry are South America and Australia-New Zealand. All these 
regions have already a comparative advantage in processed food (see Francois, 
van Meijl, and van Tongeren 2002) and protection encountered on their exports 
is relatively high. An expanding processed food sector stimulates both domestic 
production and imports of primary agriculture from LDCs.  
 
Figure 4-5: Average import tariffs (%) on extra-EU trade (base situation) 
 Source: GTAP database, author’s calculations 
Note: Tariffs are given as trade-weighted averages of ad valorem tariff equivalents. 
 
Trade (both exports and imports) between the EU and LDCs is growing 
relatively faster in our experiments than trade with developed countries. Already 
low trade barriers amongst OECD countries explain this. An interesting case is 
Textile and Clothing. Recall that our experiment assumes that MFA is already 
phased out (this is part of the baseline simulation), and the trade liberalisation 
experiment subsequently lowers the import tariffs on textiles and clothing. This 
greatly boosts exports from LDCs into the EU, and it crowds out the imports 
from developed economies.  
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The services industries are the only sub sector within the EU that does not see 
intra-trade shrinking. Especially transport services display positive growth rates in 
wake of rising trade volumes. 
The greater openness to imports and the opening of new export opportunities 
for products form the EU has some consequences for the development of 
output. These output developments are triggered on the one hand by trade 
developments induced by reduction in trade protection and, on the other hand, 
by the importance of international trade in sales. Only when a relatively large 
share of domestic production is exported, does export growth coincide with 
growth in production. Table 4-6 shows the percent change in output for the EU 
regions. As can be expected from the initial high protection on agricultural 
products, output developments for cereals are negative for all EU countries.  
Those EU members that rely heavily on imports and face heavy import 
competition, such as Germany, Rest EU15 and especially the Netherlands (see 
self-sufficiency index in Annex table A-3), witness the highest reduction in 
production. Production in France is decreasing as it faces stiffer competition on 
EU markets. For the Central and Eastern European countries production is 
almost unaltered because they are self-sufficient and an increase in trade does not 
change domestic production. The cattle and beef sector in the EU declines due to 
increased imports from especially South America and NAFTA. Production in the 
quota regulated dairy and sugar sectors does not change in the EU regions 
because production stays on quota and quota rents decline but remain positive. 
The development in production of processed food is explained before. The big 
net exporters within the EU, France and especially the Netherlands, increase 
output while output contracts in the other regions. 
Textile production in the EU decreases due to increased import competition 
from China and India. This is especially affecting the only big net exporting 
textile producer within the enlarged EU, Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC), whose production declines with 36%.  However, we have to 
be aware that the enlargement impact is already part of the baseline. During the 
enlargement process textile production in CEEC countries expanded rapidly, 
driven by increased exports to the EU15 countries. The new WTO round erodes 
the preferences associated wit EU membership reduces and therefore reverses 
the process. A similar observation could be made for textile and clothing imports 
from Turkey, which currently enjoys preferential access to EU markets. 
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Table 4-6: Percent change output (volume index), linear 50% cuts  
 Netherlands France Germany Rest of 
EU15 
CEEC 
candidate 
countries 
Cereals -19 -10 -12 -12 2 
Horticulture -1 4 4 4 2 
Sugar 0 0 0 0 -4 
Intensive livestock 1 2 -1 1 1 
Cattle -2 -8 -5 -8 0 
Dairy 0 0 0 0 3 
Other agriculture 0 2 0 0 6 
Processed foods 8 3 -3 -1 1 
Textiles 7 -11 -24 -26 -36 
Extraction -2 -3 -1 -2 6 
Chemicals -2 0 -1 -1 2 
Metal and elec -15 1 1 -1 454 
Other industry -2 1 -2 0 47 
Trade  0 0 0 0 3 
Transport 18 1 0 5 17 
Business serv 0 -1 0 0 4 
Other services 0 0 0 0 3 
Source: Model simulations.   
 
For manufacturing and services, we simulate rather limited production responses 
within the EU. Small production effects are observed for trade services, business 
services and other services. Although these sectors obtain a positive growth in 
their exports, this does not significantly influence their production because these 
services are still predominantly operating at the national level. Their exports and 
imports form are a relatively small share of production (Their self-sufficiency 
indicator equals about 1 for all services sectors in every EU region).  
 31
An exception is transport and logistics, where we observe notable production 
increases within the EU due increased trade volumes. The transport and logistics 
sector facilitates the shipment and distribution of larger trade volumes. 
Production expands especially in the Netherlands.  
Within manufacturing the only big change in production is in the Metal and 
electro technical industries, which contract in the Netherlands and expand in 
CEECs. One should not overestimate the effect in CEECs. The sector in the 
CEECs is very small and it partly recovers from the simulated production slump 
during the enlargement process.  
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